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INDIGENT WOMEN AND ABORTION:
LIMITATION OF
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN
MAHER V. ROE
[A]s you know there are many things in life that are not
fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can't. But I
don't believe that the Federal Government should take action to
try to make these opportunities exactly equal, particularly when
there is a moral factor involved.1
These were the words of President Carter,2 commenting on the
Maher v. Roe3 ruling that states can deny Medicaid funds for elective
abortions while, at the same time, provide the funds for services as-
sociated with childbirth and therapeutic abortions.4 The practical effect
of such a ruling is to preclude indigent women from procuring an
abortion while leaving women who can afford an abortion with no state
imposed obstacle to their constitutionally protected right to choose -an
abortion. Because a state may subsidize expenses related to childbirth but
not abortion, indigent women are effectively deprived of their right to
decide whether or not to terminate their pregnancies. These disparate
results raise fundamental issues in the due process and equal protection
context.
In the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade,5 the Supreme Court
established the right of a woman to choose whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. 6 Although the right enunciated in Roe was not absolute,7
1. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977 at 1, col. 4.
2. Carter was severely criticized for the moral judgment implicit in his statement as
well as for his willingness to sanction inequality for abortion treatment. See generally
Time, July 4, 1977 at 6; Newsweek, July 4, 1977 at 12; The Nation, July 23, 1977; Time,
August 1, 1977 at 49.
3. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
4. In the wake of the Court's decision in Maher, Congress enacted federal legislation
within the parameters of the Court's pronouncement. The final version of the bill allows
Medicaid reimbursement for abortion only in order to save the mother's life if two doctors
certify she would suffer severe and long-lasting physical health damage, and for victims of
rape and incest if the attacks are promptly reported to law enforcement or public health
authorities. Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. 410 U.S. at 162-64.
7. Id. at 154.
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it was declared that the woman's choice, in concurrence with her physi-
cian, was to be free from any state interference in the first trimester of
pregnancy. 8 Four years later in Maher, the Supreme Court has restricted
the nature and scope of that fundamental right.9
This note will examine the nature and scope of the fundamental right
recognized in Roe, the interpretation of that right as set forth in Maher,
and the implication of this decision on the abortion right.
THE MAHER DECISION
In accordance with a regulation issued by the Connecticut Welfare
Department,10 state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions were
provided only for those deemed medically necessary. Mary Poe, a
sixteen year old student who had obtained an abortion in a Connecticut
hospital, was denied reimbursement for the procedure by the Department
of Social Services because of her failure to obtain a certificate of medical
necessity. Similarly, due to her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medically necessary, Susan Roe, an unwed mother of
three children, was unable to obtain an abortion." As a result Poe, Roe,
and the class they represented brought an action in federal district court 12
challenging the regulation as inconsistent with the requirements of Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, 13 and as a violation of their constitutional
8. Id. at 164.
9. 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977).
10. CONNECTICUT WELFARE DEPARTMENT, 3 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL§ 275. Section 275 provides in relevant part:
The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical Assist-
ance (Title XIX) program when the following conditions are met:
I. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medically neces-
sary. The term "medically necessary" includes psychiatric necessity.
2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or licensed
clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy...
3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient and in the
case of a minor, from the parent or guardian ...
4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of Medical
Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social Services. Id.
11. 97 S. Ct. at 2379 n.3.
12. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975). This action had been brought as
a class action.
In a companion case decided the same day as Maher, the Supreme Court reversed a
three-judge district court decision and held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975), did not require the funding of non-therapeut-
ic abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program established by the
Act. See Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2366 (1977).
In a third related case, the Court upheld a policy choice implemented by the Mayor of
St. Louis to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing
corresponding services for non-therapeutic abortions. See Poelker v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2391
(1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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rights to due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1
4
The district court held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, not
only allowed state funding of non-therapeutic abortions, but also re-
quired it, as the statute must be construed in such a manner as to avoid
the infringement of constitutionally protected rights.15 The court rea-
soned that it would be improper for state regulation of Medicaid funding
for abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy to impose requirements or
conditions that were not equally applicable to Medicaid funding for
childbirth. 16
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the Social Security Act was neutral concerning pay-
ments, that the Act allowed payments for elective abortions, but did not
require the state to pay for the services. 17 The appellate court stated that it
would be wrong to construe the statute as including a requirement which
is not present in its language and which Congress did not intend to
include and remanded the case to the district court to consider the
constitutional issues raised.1"
Accordingly, a three-judge district court was convened in order to
hear the constitutional issues raised in the complaint.19 In declaring the
Connecticut regulation invalid, the court held that although there is no
independent constitutional right to a state-financed abortion, the equal
protection clause prohibits the exclusion of non-therapeutic abortions
from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes those medical
expenses associated with pregnancy and childbirth.20 The court found
implicit in Roe, the view that "abortion and childbirth. . . are simply
two alternative medical methods dealing with pregnancy." 21
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the equal protec-
tion clause does not require a state participating in the Medicaid program
14. Primary emphasis will be placed on the equal protection analysis by which the
Supreme Court treated this case, with special attention being accorded the "fundamental
interest" strand of equal protection.
15. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 730-31 (D. Conn. 1974).
16. Id. at 731.
17. Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. Id. at 935.
19. A three-judge district court panel was empowered to enjoin the enforcement of
any state statute as unconstitutional pursuant to Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968
(then codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)). This section was repealed: Act of August 12,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119. Repeal of § 2281 however, was notapplicable
to any action commenced on or before August 12, 1976.
20. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (1975).
21. Id. at 663 n.3.
1977]
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to pay those expenses associated with non-therapeutic abortions merely
because it has chosen to bear the expenses incident to childbirth.22
THE ABORTION RIGHT AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A woman's right to elect an abortion was found to be a constitution-
ally protected one in the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade2 3 and its
companion case, Doe v. Bolton. 24 In Roe, a Texas statute making it a
crime to procure an abortion except when the mother's life was in danger
was declared invalid.21 The Supreme Court held that encompassed within
the constitutional right of privacy was a qualified right for a woman to
terminate her pregnancy.2 6 The Court ruled that during the first trimester
of pregnancy the decision to terminate a pregnancy was to be left
exclusively to the woman in concurrence with her physician. 27 In the
second trimester, the state was allowed to regulate the abortion procedure
to the extent that it was necessary for the health of the mother;28 and in
the third trimester, that stage subsequent to "viability," the state was
permitted to regulate and even proscribe abortion except when the life or
health of the mother was in jeopardy. 29 In Doe, the Supreme Court, in
addition to striking down the criminal prohibition of a Georgia abortion
statute,3" invalidated a number of procedural requirements on the basis
that they too severely limited the patient's rights. 3'
22. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977). In addition to upholding the regulation which
denied expenses for elective abortions, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the
Connecticut regulation requiring prior written consent by the woman and prior authoriza-
tion by the Department of Social Services for abortions. Id. at 2386.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the purposes of this note, the Roe v. Wade decision will
be emphasized because it contains a more comprehensive analysis of the nature and scope
of the abortion right than does its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
decided the same day.
24. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
25. Tex. Laws 1907, ch. 33, at 55 (codified as TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.1
(Vernon 1976)).
26. The Court concluded: "The right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to
include the abortion choice, nevertheless, it is not an absolute right and is subject to some
limitations." 410 U.S. at 155.
27. Id. at 164.
28. Id.
29. Id. It is in the last two stages of pregnancy that the state interest is considered
compelling enough to warrant intrusion into the woman's decisional right.
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 (1972). The Georgia abortion statute was more liberal
than the Texas statute stricken in Roe. Whereas the Texas statute only permitted abor-
tions when the mother's life was endangered, the Georgia statute permitted abortions
when the pregnancy resulted from rape or it was likely the fetus would be born with
serious defects. The new Georgia abortion statute enacted after Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973), is codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1201 (Supp. 1977).
31. The following procedures were declared invalid: (1) that the abortion be perform-
ed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; (2) that
the procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion committee; (3) that two other
[Vol. 13:287
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A woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy arises from that area of the law known as the right of privacy.
32
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court deter-
mined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of fights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.33
Although the right of privacy had manifested itself in a number of
different contexts since 1886, 34 it was not until the 1965 Supreme Court
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut35 that this right achieved true
constitutional status as a "fundamental right." 36 By way of invalidating a
law which prohibited the use of contraceptives, Justice Douglas drew on
a number of prior decisions which suggested that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance." 37 The Court in Roe
licensed physicians beside the patient's attending physician confirm the procedure and (4)
that the patient be a resident of Georgia. 410 U.S. at 193-201.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See note 26 supra.
33. Id.
34. In that year the Supreme Court declared that individuals shall be protected against
all government invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The expression "right of privacy" was
introduced in 1890 with the publication of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' famous
work, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Since that time the Supreme
Court has recognized the right of privacy as implicit in the following amendments to the
Constitution: first amendment, see, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963) (first amendment right of free association allowing
individuals to forego disclosure of membership lists before investigating committee);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right of expression protects the possession of
obscene materials in the privacy of one's home). Fourth amendment, see, e.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (right of privacy protects individuals from having their
houses searched without a warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (the
use of electronic eavesdropping devices constitutes an illegal search and seizure infringing
on the right of privacy); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to pedestrians as well as individuals who
are in their homes). Fifth amendment, see, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406,416
(1966) (the self-incrimination clause allows an individual to resist making statements that
invade his right to lead a private life). Ninth amendment, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring) (right of privacy protects
certain rights not necessarily enumerated in the Constitution).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 484-86. See id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Instead of relying upon
segments of other amendments to formulate the right of privacy, the Griswold decision
signaled the creation of an independent constitutional right of privacy. See Henkin,
Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423 (1974).
37. 381 U.S. at 482. Those decisions upon which Justice Douglas relied included:
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations, recognized as a peripheral first amendment right); Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50, 261-63 (1957) (freedom of association overrides overbroad
legislative investigation of loyalty); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (denial
5
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gave even greater protection to the right of privacy by securing a position
for it in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty. 38 Rely-
ing on Griswold and a number of prior decisions relating to procreative, 39
marital' and familial rights,41 the Supreme Court extended the right of
privacy from a penumbral right to one firmly established in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 42
In spite of its new found status as an enumerated, due process
protected right, the "Roe recognized right" was not deemed absolute. It
was acknowledged that the right to decide whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy must be measured against conceivable state interests in regula-
tion. 43 The extent that this right could be interfered with, however, was
dependent on the state's ability to demonstrate a compelling interest. 44 In
Roe, the Supreme Court did not recognize any such compelling interest
of employment based on taking loyalty oath cannot be arbitrary); Martin v. Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (right to distribute, receive, and read, grounded in first amendment);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right to educate one's children as one
chooses derived from the force of the first and fourteenth amendments); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right of access to spectrum of available knowledge
implicitly recognized in the first amendment).
38. 410 U.S. at 153. See note 42 infra.
39. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 435-54 (1967) (the right of equal access to
contraceptives for single people as well as married couples); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (sterilization laws held to be an infringement on the basic liberties
of marriage and procreation).
40. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidation of anti-miscegenation law).
41. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (recognition of private realm of
family life which state cannot infringe upon); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (liberty of parents to educate and rear
their children as they choose).
42. Unlike Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1964), which held that the
right of privacy was a fundamental but unenumerated right, the right in Roe was recog-
nized as a fundamental enumerated right falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
For a harsh criticism of the Roe decision and its expansive interpretation of the right
of privacy, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973). For a contrary view supporting the decision, see Heymann & Barzelay,
The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1973); see
also Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); For an
excellent satire on the right of privacy in the abortion context, see Choate, Exploring the
Boundaries of the Roe Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, J. Mo. B. 242
(1977), reprinted in, 11 ARK. LAW. 110 (1977); Choate, An Examination of the Right of
Privacy: A Modem Proposal, (Jan. 22, 1977) (unpublished article in University of Tulsa
College of Law Library).
43. 410 U.S. at 155. See also notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
44. See id. Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest. See,
e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Examples of
legitimate state regulation in this area are requirements as to qualifications of the person
who is to perform the abortion; as to licensing; as to facilities where the procedure is to be
performed (hospital, clinic, or less-than-hospital status). 410 U.S. at 163.
[Vol. 13:287
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in the first trimester of pregnancy, 45 and thereby preserved the woman's
right of privacy and the attendant right to choose an abortion, precluding
any infringement by the state. It was not until the second and third
trimesters of pregnancy that the state's interest in the health of the
mother46 and the fetus,47 warranted state intrusion into the woman's
fundamental right of privacy.
With the advent of this fundamental, albeit qualified, right of
privacy recognized in Roe, it became a matter of considerable specula-
tion as to how comprehensive this right was and what type and degree of
state pre-emption would constitute an improper infringement upon it.'
This was the focus in a number of subsequent decisions where the Court
elaborated on the nature and scope of the right established in Roe. In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,49 requirements that women and minors
obtain consent from their spouses and parents before they could have an
abortion were held unconstitutional.50 The Court reasoned that because
the state was absolutely prohibited from interfering with the woman's
decisional right in the first trimester of pregnancy, it was not permissible
to delegate a potential veto power to a third party.51 In Bellotti v.
Baird,52 a parental consent requirement similar to the provision stricken
in Planned Parenthood was at issue.53 In that case, a new standard was
articulated for determining the validity of restrictive abortion regulations.
It was declared that a state requirement would be deemed unconstitution-
al if it "unduly burdened the right to seek an abortion." 54 Finally, in
another privacy case, Carey v. Population Services International,55 the
Court invalidated a New York statute which forbade the sale of
contraceptives to minors under sixteen years old, limited the authority to
sell contraceptives to pharmacists, and forbade the public display and
45. 410 U.S. at 164.
46. Id. at 163.
47. The Court noted: "With respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id.
48. For commentary on the nature of the right to an abortion, see Comment, Abortion
on Demand In A Post-Wade Context: Must The State Pay The Bills? 41 FORDHAM L. REV.
921 (1973).
49. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
50. Id. at 68-72 (such a requirement was seen as allowing a third party veto).
51. Id. at 69.
52. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
53. The requirements applied only to unmarried women under age 18. Id. at 151.
54. Id. at 147.
55. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). This case differs from Maher only in the sense that the state-
created restrictions there dealt with access to contraceptives rather than abortions. See 97
S. Ct. 2376, 2384 n.10.
1977]
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advertisement of the devices. 56 Placing primary reliance on Roe, Doe
and Planned Parenthood, the Court stated:
The significance of these cases is that they establish that the
same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an
individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or termi-
nate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of
effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that
prohibit the decision entirely .
These subsequent cases interpreted the nature and scope of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe in a broad manner: The criminal
prohibition of abortion invalidated in Roe constituted an absolute impedi-
ment to the exercise of a protected right, whereas the restrictions set forth
in the New York statute, and invalidated in Carey, constituted a much
lesser burden on the exercise of a protected right. Despite the varying
degree to which these regulations burdened the exercise of the right, both
were invalidated. In order that the right of privacy be adequately protect-
ed, the Court enunciated a single standard for analyzing state regulations
and their potential impact on the right. According to this standard, laws
shown to have a substantial impact on the right to decide whether to
prevent or terminate pregnancy will be invalidated as well as those which
absolutely preclude the exercise of that right.58
Although the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the issue of
the denial of Medicaid benefits for elective abortions prior to Maher, it
had some exposure to the issue in the case of Singleton v. Wulff. 59 In that
case the Court held that two physicians had standing to challenge a
Missouri statute which excluded elective abortions from Medicaid
coverage. 60 In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court did not reach the
merits in this case, 61 the decision is significant in light of the Court's
refutation of Mr. Justice Powell's contention that the statute should be
upheld on the ground that it did not "directly" interfere with the abortion
decision.62 In response to the proposal of this direct interference or
56. 431 U.S. at 678.
57. Id. at 688 (emphasis added). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
58. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
59. 428 U.S. 107 (1976).
60. Id. at 118. This case involved two physicians who sought standing to challenge a
Missouri statute which only allowed reimbursement for abortions which were "medically
indicated." The Court determined that the physicians had alleged "injury in fact" (their
business would suffer because indigent women would not be reimbursed if they had an
elective abortion) and thus had standing.
61. The Court, in an extensive discussion of the abortion issue, ruled that the two
doctors had standing to challenge a regulation similar to the one in Maher, and remanded
the case to the district court for a decision on the merits. See id.
62. Justice Powell relied on the Court's prior decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,
[Vol. 13:287
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"interdiction" test, the Court declared, "For a doctor who cannot afford
to work for nothing and a woman who cannot afford to pay him, the
State's refusal to fund an abortion is as effective an "interdiction" of it
as would ever be necessary., 63
In a number of lower federal court decisions, regulations similar to
the one presented in Maher were invalidated on statutory grounds 64 as
well as under due process65 and equal protection analyses. 6 In Roe v.
Norton,67 the decision appealed in Maher, a three-judge district court
declared the Medicaid regulation invalid, reasoning that a state which
declines to subsidize elective abortions, while subsidizing therapeutic
abortions, prenatal and postnatal care, effectively inhibits women from
exercising their constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion.68
Under an equal protection analysis, such regulations serve to de-
prive women, otherwise eligible, of Medicaid assistance solely on the
basis that they have elected to have an abortion. 69 The denial of these
benefits in this context would appear to create a sufficient state-imposed
burden to warrant a showing of compelling state interests.70
381 U.S. 479 (1964), Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1972), in pointing out that, in those instances, the state directly
interdicted the normal functioning of the physician-patient relationship by criminalizing
certain procedures whereas the regulation in this case constituted a lesser infringement
upon the relationship. Id. at 128.
63. 428 U.S. at 118 n.7.
64. Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (where the state has
already determined that pregnancy necessitates medical services, elective abortions can
not validly be classified as unnecessary so as to render them non-reimbursable under the
Pennsylvania medical assistance program). See also Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) aff'd mem., 412 U.S. 924 (1973), vacated and
remanded, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974) (informal policy of executive director
of state department of social services, precluding indigent pregnant women from receiving
welfare subsidized abortions unless necessary to save woman's life, regardless of her
trimester, constituted invidious discrimination in violation of fourteenth amendment);
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973) (state infringement on the effectuation
of woman's decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy in concurrence with her
physician in the first trimester violates woman's ninth and fourteenth amendments rights
of privacy and liberty).
66. Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D.S.D. 1974) (equal protection clause does
not prohibit disparate treatment per se, but where fundamental rights are limited by a
state-created classification, state must exhibit a compelling interest justifying classifica-
tion, expressed by a narrowly drawn statute reflecting these compelling state interests
only).
67. 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975).
68. Her choice is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the
abortion, but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses not to
have an abortion. When the State thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must
assert a compelling state interest that justifies the incursion.
Id. at 663 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1973)). See note 12 supra.
69. See note 66 supra. See also Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.
1973). See note 64 supra.
70. Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 191 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
1977]
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JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF "THE ABORTION RIGHT" IN MAHER v. RoE
Recognizing the challenge to the Connecticut regulation as one
arising under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court analyzed the case within the framework of the accepted equal
protection test: Initially, a determination must be made of whether the
regulation has an adverse effect on some recognized suspect class, or
whether it impinges on a fundamental right that is explicitly or implicitly
recognized in the Constitution. If such an interference is present, the
legislation must undergo strict judicial scrutiny. If neither a suspect class
nor fundamental right is present, the regulation must still be analyzed to
determine whether its means are rationally related to some permissible
and articulated state purpose.7'
The Maher Court, determining that indigent women seeking an
abortion did not fall within a suspect class,72 went on to address the major
question in this case, "whether the regulation impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.",73
Declaring that the district court misinterpreted the nature and scope of the
71. The Court relied upon the test as stated in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312-14 (1976). In order to better understand the Court's analysis under equal protec-
tion, a brief history and commentary is set out below:
The Warren Court in its later years used a two-tiered equal protection analysis
whereby laws which had an adverse impact on a suspect class or impinged upon a
fundamental right would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and therefore require a
compelling state interest for justification. In other cases, the law was required to bear only
a rational relationship to its statutory purpose. This method of equal protection analysis
has been referred to as the "new equal protection," with scrutiny that was "strict" in
theory and fatal in fact, as opposed to the deferential "old" equal protection, which
required minimal scrutiny in theory, and virtually none in fact. Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. Rzv. 1, 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
The Burger Court, not finding the rigid two-tiered approach suited to its purposes,
altered the equal protection scheme by requiring more state justification when implement-
ing the rational basis analysis and using less rigor than the Warren Court in applying strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1974). This intermediate level of scrutiny has been christened the "Newer" equal protec-
tion or minimum scrutiny with "bite." See Gunther, supra this note, at 20. See generally
Wilkonson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
72. "[T]his Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class
for purposes of equal protection analysis." 97 S. Ct. at 2381. See also San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Those categories which the Court has characterized as suspect include: race, see, e.g.,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); alienage, see, e.g., Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and, to a limited degree, illegitimacy, see, eg., Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
73. 97 S. Ct. at 2381.
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right recognized in Roe, the Court concluded that there was no infringe-
ment upon a fundamental right.74 This conclusion was based on the
premise that there is a constitutionally significant distinction between
direct state infringement on a protected right and state support of a policy
preference initiated by the legislature. 75 Mr. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, characterized the Connecticut regulation as merely evincing
encouragement by the state of an alternative activity. The fact that state
aid was provided for prenatal and postnatal care and not for elective
abortions, according to Justice Powell, did not place any "obstacles-
absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. 
7 6
In distinguishing this case from prior invalidations of abortion-
related regulations, the majority utilized the following comparative ap-
proach: A criminal statute, proscribing the procurement of an abortion
77
or a requirement of spousal consent before a woman can obtain an
abortion, 78 constitute absolute obstacles to the procurement of an abor-
tion and thus are constitutionally impermissible. However, the right
recognized in Roe was not an unqualified right to an abortion and the
woman was only protected from unduly burdensome interference with
her choice in deciding whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 79 The
Court, in the instant case, concluded that the Connecticut regulation did
not establish an absolute obstacle to, nor did it unduly burden the
woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy. 80 Justice Powell
reasoned that, "[t]he State may have made childbirth a more attractive
alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed
no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.' 81
Having found neither the presence of a suspect class nor the infring-
ement of a fundamental right, the Court then analyzed the Connecticut
74. Id. The Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) decision, which held that a woman had a
fundamental right to choose to terminate her pregnancy, was created in the context of
substantive due process. The status of this right as analyzed under equal protection is not
as clear-cut. It has been argued that on this basis, in spite of its fundamental right status, a
regulation impinging upon the woman's right to decide need not be accorded the same
scrutiny as it would in the context of due process. See Note, Doe v. Beal: Abortion,
Medicaid and Equal Protection, 62 VA. L. REV. 811 (1976).
75. See Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 107, 128
(1976) (Powell, J., dissenting); see note 62 supra and accompanying text.
76. 97 S. Ct. at 2382. See note 60 and accompanying text.
77. See notes 25 & 30 supra.
78. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976). See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
79. 97 S. Ct. at 2382.
80. The Court relied primarily on Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147(1976). See 97S.
Ct. at 2382.
81. 97 S. Ct. at 2383.
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scheme to determine whether the distinction made between childbirth and
non-therapeutic abortions was rationally related to a constitutionally
permissible state purpose. 82
Drawing on dicta from Roe which acknowledged that a state has a
strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, and considering
the rising costs of medical care, the majority concluded that state subsidi-
zation of costs associated with childbirth was a rational means of en-
couraging childbirth.8 3 By way of summation, Justice Powell let it be
known that the Court was not unmindful of the plight of indigent women
who cannot afford an abortion, but pointed out that an issue of this sort,
fraught with conflicting policy, religious and moral considerations, was a
matter best left to legislative judgment. 84
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan assailed the majority opinion
declaring that, "[a] distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished
pregnant women is inherent in the Court's analysis. The stark reality for
too many, not just "some," indigent pregnant women is that indigency
makes access to competent licensed physicians not merely "difficult"
but "impossible.'"85
Recalling the Singleton decision, which rejected Justice Powell's
direct interference or interdiction test, 86 Justice Brennan stated that there
was no precedent to support a test which distinguished between absolute
obstacles to the abortion right and those obstacles which were merely less
burdensome. Premising his conclusion on the right recognized in Roe
and elucidated in its progeny, Justice Brennan reasoned that the coercive
effect of the Connecticut regulation was such that it impinged upon the
right recognized therein87 and should therefore be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.
82. 97 S. Ct. at 2385. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Note that
the Lindsey test requires the distinction drawn by a regulation to be rationally related to a
constitutionally permissible purpose whereas the more stringent Rodriguez test, San
Antonio School Dist.. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), see note 71 supra and accom-
panying text, requires that the regulation be rationally related to an articulated state
purpose. This is a critical distinction in Maher, because initially Connecticut declared its
purpose for the regulation to be fiscal conservation. This was rejected by the lower Court,
because abortion is actually the least expensive medical response to pregnancy. Roe v.
Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D. Conn. 1974). When the Court scrutinizes the regulation
under the Lindsey standard, however, there is much more leeway to hypothesize conceiv-
able state purposes.
83. 97 S. Ct. at 2385. Additionally, the Court hypothesized that the state may have
legitimate concerns as to its rate of population growth. Id. at 2385 n. 11.
84. Id. at 2385.
85. 97 S. Ct. at 2378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).








In order to preserve the constitutionality of the Connecticut
Medicaid regulation, Justice Powell resurrected his once rejected direct
interference test, 88 which had the effect of compromising the nature and
scope of the right to elect an abortion as recognized in Roe and its
progeny. In implementing this new standard, Powell distinguished prior
invalidations of abortion regulations on the basis that they imposed
absolute or unduly burdensome restrictions on the abortion right whereas
the Connecticut regulation constituted a lesser inhibition of the right.
Such an analysis is not consistent with the Roe decision and the
subsequent cases interpreting the right recognized therein. A number of
restrictive abortion regulations constituting less than an absolute bar to
abortion access had been struck down as unconstitutional. 89 Indeed, in
Carey, another privacy case decided the same term as Maher, it was
explicitly stated that the same test must be applied to state regulations
which burden the exercise of the right to terminate a pregnancy as is
applied to statutes which absolutely prohibit the action.
90
As Justice Brennan so properly noted, 91 in the context of other
fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has shown its willingness to
invalidate laws which did not establish an absolute prohibition of the
exercise of a right. In the context of first amendment rights it is a well
accepted principle that states are not permitted to grant government funds
on the condition that a citizen waive his or her constitutional rights. Thus,
in Sherbert v. Verner,92 a ruling denying a woman unemployment
compensation because she refused to work on Saturdays, in accordance
with her religious beliefs, was declared unconstitutional. This case and
its progeny 93 support the proposition that a compelling state interest must
be demonstrated not only when a state imposed obstacle absolutely
precludes the exercise of a fundamental right, but also when restraints are
imposed which simply make the exercise of that right more difficult.
The Supreme Court has also acted to invalidate laws which had a
88. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 107, 118-28 (1976). See notes 61 & 62 supra, and
accompanying text.
89. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See note 31 & notes 49-59 supra, and
accompanying text.
90. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See notes 55-57 supra, and accompanying text.
91. 97 S. Ct. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
93. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 358
U.S. 589 (1967). See generally Butler, The Right to Abortion Under Medicaid, 7 Clearing-
house Rev. 713 (1974).
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relatively minimal impact upon the fundamental right to vote. In Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 9 4 the Court held invalid a reapportionment law which
caused a dilution of voting strength in various districts. Although the
malapportionment of the Alabama legislature there did not directly ob-
struct the right to vote, the Court struck down the plan on the basis that it
denied similarly situated constituents equal protection of the law, as
required by the fourteenth amendment.
A better approach to the issues in Maher would have adopted the
"penalty analysis" utilized in Shapiro v. Thompson.95 In that case a one-
year residency requirement for receiving welfare benefits was held to be
an unconstitutional infringement on the fundamental right to travel.
Although the statute did not absolutely proscribe an individual's right to
travel, it penalized the exercise of that right. Likewise, the Connecticut
regulation in Maher, while not presenting an absolute bar to the exercise
of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, can penalize the
exercise of that right.
If Justice Powell's direct interference test had been applied in the
situation presented in Sherbert v. Verner,96 the conditioning of unem-
ployment compensation there, based on the waiver of one's right to
freedom of worship, could have been sustained on the basis that it merely
evidenced a legislative preference which did not directly impair the
protected right. Similarly, if the Powell test had been invoked in Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 97 and related cases, 98 the discriminatory apportionment
could have been upheld on the rationale that while it diluted the value of
votes, it did not present an absolute obstacle to the right to vote. An
equally undesirable result would have occurred in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son99 had the Powell test been implemented. In that case, the residency
requirement for welfare benefits could have been sustained on the theory
that the legislature merely made a policy choice that encouraged stable
residency and that the law did not directly interfere with the fundamental
right to travel.
In the context of these fundamental rights, the application of Justice
94. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Conner v. Finch 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
95. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250(1974). See generally Note, Medicaid Assistance For Elective Abortions: The Statutory
and Constitutional Issues, 50 ST. JoHN'S U.L.J. 751 (1976); Note, Medicaid And The
Abortion Right, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 404 (1976).
96. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See notes 92 & 93 supra and accompanying text.
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
98. Conner v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975), See
note 94 supra, and accompanying text.
99. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See note 95 supra, and accompanying text.
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Powell's test illustrates the defect inherent in his result-oriented ap-
proach. Indeed, the critical aspect presented in Maher is not that a total
prohibition of abortion was erected by the Connecticut regulation, but
that the regulation unduly interfered with a woman's fundamental right to
choose whether to terminate her pregnancy free from state interfer-
ence. 100
Even assuming the validity of the Powell test, that an absolute
prohibition must be present to mandate the invalidation of a regulation, it
would appear that such an absolute obstacle is in fact present in Maher.
From the standpoint of many indigent women who do not have the means
to finance an abortion, the regulation may indeed serve to preclude their
procurement of an abortion. 101 Inasmuch as their wealthy counterparts
have no financial obstacle to overcome, the Connecticut funding scheme
establishes an absolute barrier, unique to poor women.
Another defect in the Court's analysis is the implication that because
the right in Roe was not declared to be an absolute one its status as a
fundamental right is not as well established as other recognized funda-
mental rights. This is not an accurate assumption. The abortion right is
qualified only in the limited sense that the state may have a compelling
interest concomitant with the stage of pregnancy. Such an interest,
however, does not appear until the second trimester, the right in the first
trimester being absolute and one which the state is not allowed to
interfere with.
The practical consequences of the Maher ruling are unfortunate. By
way of inducing women to carry their pregnancies to term and thereby
qualify for Medicaid subsidization, the Connecticut regulation upheld by
the Court is tacitly encouraging women to bring unwanted children into
an insensitive and often hostile environment. There is good reason to
believe that a number of these unwanted children of indigent parents will
grow up in foster homes, orphanages, and reform schools throughout the
country."° Additionally, many of these children will likely attend sec-
ond-rate segregated schools. 103 There is a grim irony inherent in the
100. 97 S. Ct. at 2390.
101. In a companion case, the Court noted:
Although an abortion performed during the first trimester of pregnancy is a
relatively inexpensive surgical procedure, usually costing under $200, even this
modest sum is far beyond the means of most medicaid recipients. And "if one
does not have it and is unable to get it the fee might as well be" one hundred times
as great.
Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2394, 2395 n.1 (1977) (quoting from Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708,
712 (1961)).
102. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2394, 2396 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) citing Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
103. Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2394, 2396 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)).
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proponents of the "right to life" argument, in that many of those lives,
for whom they purport to speak, will ultimately be tainted by bare
subsistence and, in some instances, the stigma of parental rejection.
IMPLICATIONS
The Maher decision substantially erodes the constitutionally pro-
tected right to terminate one's pregnancy as enunciated in Roe. Under
Justice Powell's direct interference test, presently enacted abortion regu-
lations will be more likely to escape judicial scrutiny under the compel-
ling state interest standard. Implementation of this direct interference test
would permit the Supreme Court to simply regard a regulation as evinc-
ing a legislative policy preference, thereby immunizing it from the
rigorous scrutiny accorded fundamental rights in the past. One of the
primary arguments advanced by the Court in support of its decision was
that an issue such as the abortion controversy should be resolved in the
more public forum, the legislature. 4 This ignores the crux of the Roe
decision. In Roe, the Court, upon recognizing the controversial and
personal nature of the abortion issue, sought to remove its consideration
from the political arena by leaving the decision to terminate one's
pregnancy with the woman and her physician. Maher disregards this
sound rationale and once again moves the moral and religious issues of
the abortion controversy to the forefront of the political arena. This is an
unfortunate result.
To the extent that the history of the fundamental interest strand of
the equal protection clause has been the protection of certain inalienable
rights and liberties, the Court seems to have foresaken one of its primary
functions in the Maher decision. This is made clear by the apparent
willingness of the Court to characterize an abortion regulation which
impinged upon the constitutionally protected right to decide to terminate
a pregnancy as a mere legislative directive. In this regard, it is evident
that Maher has substantially compromised the fundamental right to
terminate one's pregnancy. By deferring to the Connecticut legislature, it
appears that the Court is now willing to uphold attempts by states to
impose moral viewpoints on their constituents. 5 Such attempts should
not be constitutionally permissible. Furthermore, Justice Powell's direct
interference test may surface again in subsequent Court decisions and
have a significant impact on other fundamental rights as well. 106
104. Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2385-86 (1977). See note 84 supra and accompany-
ing text.
105. This was the conclusion of Justice Marshall in Beal v. Doe, 97 S. Ct. 2394, 2395
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (1977).
106. See notes 96-100 supra, and accompanying text.
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Roe recognized that a woman has a constitutionally protected right
to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Subsequent cases
interpreting the nature and scope of that right have construed it in a broad
manner. Indeed, those cases established the principle that the same test
must be applied to regulations which burden the right to decide to
terminate a pregnancy, as are applied to those which absolutely prohibit
the exercise of the right.
Maher was decided in a way flatly inconsistent with this line of
development. By implementing a new, less stringent standard to deter-
mine the validity of regulations impinging upon the abortion decision, the
Supreme Court has not only misconstrued the nature and scope of the
right recognized in Roe, but it has dealt a severe blow to a woman's
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